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Abstract 
 
With China’s rapid economic progress and steady increase in its international 
influence, China has gradually embarked on the soft power idea and has made 
developing its soft power as its national strategy. We argue that China’s soft 
power strategy is in accordance to Chinese Confucian culture and political value 
and fits well with its grand strategy of peaceful rise. Based on existing 
conceptualizations of soft power, we expanded the sources of soft power to six 
pillars: cultural attractiveness, political values, development model, international 
institutions, international image, and economic temptation. We also identified 
three channels for wielding soft power: formal, economic, and cultural 
diplomacies. Putting all the basics together, we present an integrative model of 
soft power. Accordingly, we analyze the sources and limits of China’s soft 
power and suggest how to improve it.  
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1. China has embarked on the soft power idea 
Over the last three decades since its reform and opening up, China has 
made a remarkable progress. It has maintained an average close to ten percent 
annual growth rate in purchase power parity term for thirty years (Worm, 2008). 
According to the official data of Hong Kong Trade Development Council1, China 
is now the world’s third largest economy and the third largest trading nation in 
the world, the second largest exporter, the largest holder of foreign exchange 
reserves, and the largest attractor of foreign direct investment (FDI) among 
developing and transition economies2. China’s achievement is not confined to 
economic, but also in other non-economic domains. The United Nations’ Human 
Development Reports reveal that China has made dramatic improvement in 
terms of Human Development Index, risen continuously from 0.557 in 1980 to 
0.777 in 2005, ranking 81st out of 177 countries3. According to a study by the 
Georgia Institute of Technology, China has rapidly improved its overall 
technology competitiveness and China may soon rival the United States for 
world technological leadership 4 . One prominent case is that China has 
successfully launched its manned spacecraft with three astronauts on board 
and realized its first-ever space walk in September 2008, which makes China 
the third country in the world who is able to conduct extravehicular activity in 
space following the former Soviet Union and the United States 5 . In a 
backgrounder of the Council on Foreign Relations6, Bajoria (2009) argues that 
China since the 1990s has dramatically improved its military capabilities on land 
and sea, in the air, and in space, and U.S. military planners see the potential for 
China to develop as a ‘peer competitor’. One evidence could be China’s 
successful anti-satellite missile test in January 20077, which shows China has 
mastered the military capability in space.  
On the international stage, China has shown increasing influence. In East 
Asia, China has hosted the six-party talk on North Korea’s nuclear issue. China 
called for establishing a free trade area with ASEAN (Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations) which is expected to accomplish in 2010. China and Malaysia 
proposed the East Asia Summit which will have a significant impact on the 
geopolitics and power structure of Asia (Nye, 2005). China also hosts the Boao 
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Forum for Asia which is sometimes called the Asian version of World Economic 
Forum in Davos8. In Central Asia, China initiated the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization and takes part in the six-nation talk on Iran’s nuclear issue. In 
Africa, more and more Chinese engineers and business people appears in 
many Sub-Saharan countries. In 2006, China successfully held the Beijing 
Summit of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation which attracted more than 40 
African state leaders. In Latin America, China has strengthened its economic 
cooperative relationships with Mexico, Cuba, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, and 
Chile, among others. In Oceania, China has paid increasing attention to the 
developing Pacific islands countries which is evidenced by the 2006 China-
Pacific Island summit in Fiji (Wesley-Smith, 2007). In addition, China also 
strengthens its ties with the US, EU and Australia through the mechanisms of 
China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogues9, China-EU Summit, and free 
trade area agreement with Australia (and already with New Zealand). On some 
global issues, China has also made its voices, such as in the WTO Cancun 
trade talk, in combating Somali pirates, and in dealing with the global financial 
crisis. China has sent more peace-keeping personnel than three other UN 
Security Council permanent members – Russia, UK and US (Gill and Huang, 
2009). And some Chinese people are starting to assume top positions in 
international organization, such as the World Health Organization10, the World 
Bank11, the International Olympic Committee12, and the United Nations13. In 
2008, China has successfully held the Beijing Olympic Games and China will 
hold the Shanghai World Expo in 2010.  
With this backdrop, Harvard’s Professor Joseph S. Nye, the father of soft 
power theory, saw a clear contrast between the decline of American’s soft 
power (Nye, 2004) and the rise of China’s soft power (Nye, 2005). The concept 
of soft power was first coined in Nye’s (1990a) book Bound to Lead: The 
Changing Nature of American Power. Although the first Chinese article on soft 
power was published in 1993 by Wang Huning (cited in Li, 2008: 6)14, who was 
then a professor of political science at Fudan University and now a member of 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee Secretariat, it is only 
until recent years that Chinese discourse has paid an enormous amount of 
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attention to the idea of soft power and its relevance to China’s foreign strategy 
(Li, 2008). There is a clear surging popularity of the term ‘soft power’ among 
Chinese politicians, scholars, journalists and publics (Li, 2008). The Chinese 
government has gradually embarked on a soft power strategy. In his Political 
Report to the 16th CCP Congress, Jiang Zemin, the former President, points 
out culture plays an important role in today’s global competitition for 
comprehensive national power (Jiang, 2002). The current Party chief and 
President Hu Jintao also made clear that the increase in China’s international 
status and influence will have to be demonstrated in hard power as well as in 
soft power at the Central Foreign Affairs Leadership Group meeting on 4 
January 2006 (cited in Ma, 2007). Hu Jintao further announced that how to 
improve China’s soft power through cultural development is one major practical 
issue facing the country (Hu, 2006). In his Political Report to the 17th CCP 
Congress, Hu once again urges the country to boost its cultural soft power (Hu, 
2007).  
 
2. Why does China need to build soft power 
The reason why China has chosen a soft power strategy is that China 
has chosen a ‘peaceful rise’ strategy and China realizes building soft power is 
an ideal solution for its peaceful rise.  
We argue China’s rise is inevitable. China is the oldest existing 
civilization with more than five thousand year history. China used to be the 
greatest power in the world in its Tang dynasty (AD 618 – 907). For thousands 
of years, China regarded itself as the superior empire sitting in the centre of the 
world and the people in distant places as barbarians. In its Ming dynasty (AD 
1368-1644), China sent out the world’s largest and most advanced fleet seven 
times to visit and trade with more than 30 countries and territories of the South 
China Sea and the Indian Ocean between 1405 and 1433, known as ‘Zheng 
He’s voyage to the West Sea’, half a century before the famous Columbus's 
voyage to America15. Unfortunately, due to the fiscal difficulty caused by the 
China-centered tribute-trade system and China’s blind arrogance, after the 
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death of Zheng He, the leader of the great fleet, China suddenly abandoned the 
sea commerce and re-adopted close-door policy which is believed to have 
caused the later decline of the imperial China. 
Since China’s defeat in the Opium War 1840-1842, China, as its people 
always say, had had 100 years of humiliation before the People’s Republic of 
China was founded. Since the overthrow of the corrupt and weak Manchurian 
government of Qing Dynasty (AD 1644-1911), Chinese leaders and people 
have never lost their ambition to restore China as a great power. Unfortunately, 
for the sake of sovereignty and dignity, China under Mao Zedong successively 
broke its relationships with the US and the Soviet Union. Anti-capitalism 
ideology and isolation from the outer world made China left far behind the 
modernization process of East Asia. At the end of the Cultural Revolution, 
Chinese economy was at the brink of bankruptcy, Deng Xiaoping decided that 
China should open up to the outside world and embark on a reform program in 
1978. Since then, China has made a phenomenal progress. Many westerners 
were shocked by Chinese economic miracle. However, we see China’s revival 
inevitable because of China’s huge population, vast land, abundant resources, 
and more important, Chinese people’s diligence and steadfast belief, all of 
which coupled with their determination of opening up can generate 
unimaginable power.  
Power shifts are always dangerous for world peace. However, it can be 
argued that it is natural for China’s rise to be a peaceful one. It is natural 
because there is no any substantial evidence to predict that China will grow in a 
non-peaceful route. Chinese history does not support that kind of prediction as 
well. It is natural also because it is less likely in today’s world China will risk to 
grow through military means because of the increased interdependence 
between nations which makes military power more costly and less transferable 
today than in earlier times (Nye, 1990b:159). As Ikenberry (2008) points out that 
China not only needs continued access to the current global capitalist system 
but also wants to protect the system’s rules and institutions because China has 
thrived in such system. In the mean time, it is necessary for China to announce 
its peaceful rise intention in order to reduce the negative impact of the ‘China 
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threat’ argument on its development. Rapid economic growth and military 
modernization have caused much concern in neighboring countries and in the 
western world. Some people use the ‘China threat’ charge and want to contain 
China’s rise. So China now very much needs a peaceful and conducive external 
environment (Li, 2008: 14) in which China can grow stably during the current 
‘important period of strategic opportunity’16.  One way to assure the world its 
peaceful rise promise is for China to act as a responsible stakeholder in the 
global system. China has well shown its responsibility during the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis by not devaluing its currency to help the affected neighboring 
countries to recover and in current global financial crisis by actively cooperating 
with other G20 economies and by signing big procurement deals with the EU 
and the US.  
China has also realized that strengthening its soft power is an important 
and ideal way to realize a peaceful rise. By definition, soft power is different 
from hard power such as military prowess, and therefore soft power competition 
is essentially a peaceful race. Soft power theory is also in accordance to 
Chinese Confucian culture and political value. As Ding (2008:195) comments 
that the idea of soft power had been consistently advocated and 
comprehensively utilized by ancient Chinese for more than two millennia. Bell 
(2008) has interpreted the Confucian views of world order as ‘a harmonious 
political order without state boundaries and governed by a sage by means of 
virtue, without any coercive power at all’ (cited in Ding, 2008: 196). Chinese 
Communist Party’s promotion of a harmonious world 17  is therefore its re-
embracing China’s traditional culture, and the CCP’s desired world order is 
therefore rather a soft power-based than hard power-based one18.   
 
3. The basics of soft power theory – Toward an integrative model 
China needs not only to reiterate its promise of a peaceful development, 
but also, more importantly, to rely on effectively building its soft power to 
improve its attraction and influence. However, currently China still lags behind 
the US in Asia in terms of soft power (Whitney and Shambaugh, 2008) and Nye 
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(2005) sees China’s soft power still has a long way to go. Before we can 
discuss how to improve China’s soft power, we need to understand the basics 
of the theory of soft power pioneered by Professor Joseph Nye.  
 
3.1 Definition of soft power 
 According to Nye (1990b: 154), power means an ability to do things and 
control others, i.e., to get others to do what they otherwise would not. Nye (2006) 
further points out three basic means to alter the behaviors of others to get what 
you want: coercion (sticks), payments (carrots) and attraction (soft power). 
Nye’s classical definition of soft power is the ability to obtain what you want 
through co-option and attraction rather than the hard power of coercion and 
payment. While most researches on soft power adopt this definition, some 
Chinese scholars have broadened the meaning of soft power and applied the 
concept not only to nations but also regions, organizations and even individuals 
(cf. Wang and Lu, 2008: 427). Although we see the value of the broader 
definitions of soft power, such as increasing government’s soft power over the 
people at home, we adopt Nye’s original definition here since the focus of the 
present paper centers on China’s international influence.  
 
3.2 Importance of soft power 
 It is widely accepted that soft power is very useful in international 
relations. We further argue soft power is also useful in economic relations. We 
identify several ways through which improved soft power can benefit a country’s 
economy. Firstly, it can create a peaceful and conducive environment for 
economic growth. Secondly, it can boost sales of a country’s products in 
another country by improved national image or by reducing the possibility of 
boycotting a country’s products. Thirdly, it can make a country’s cultural 
products attractive and popular due to its cultural attractiveness. Fourthly, it can 
help a country to attract more FDI. Fifthly, it can help a country to attract more 
tourists and business people thus a booming tourism industry. Lastly, it can 
attract more foreign students to study in the country which generate extra 
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income and those students may become a country’s ‘ambassadors’ after 
returning to their mother countries.  
 Being a form of power, soft power is directly beneficial for the holder 
country. Nevertheless, soft power can indirectly benefit other countries. For 
instance, if a country is to strengthen its soft power by promoting its culture in 
another country, then the other country will benefit from having an enriched 
cultural life and more choices of cultural consumption. Since by definition soft 
power is a power of attraction, attraction to a foreign country’s culture, political 
values and other soft power resources can help another country to understand 
the attractive country. Therefore, by strengthening soft power of many countries, 
mutual understanding among nations will be enhanced, hence, peace will be 
enhanced. 
 
3.3 Sources of soft power 
 In Nye’s (2006) conceptualization, there are three (re)sources of soft 
power:  its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values 
(when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when 
they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority). Most researchers 
follow this three-source model while some others have tried to broaden the 
content of soft power. For instance, Chinese scholar Honghua Men (2007) adds 
another two pillars into Nye’s original formula. According to him, in the case of 
China, soft power has five pillars: cultural attractiveness, political value, 
economic development model, international institution, and international image. 
We notice that Nye (2006) has acknowledged ‘a success economy is an 
important source of soft power’ which he actually means economic development 
model (cf. Wuthnow, 2008: 9) and Nye (2007) also sees promoting international 
image is one important task when it comes to developing China’s soft power. 
Therefore, we accept this broader five-pillar conception of soft power. 
 In addition to Men’s (2007) five pillars, we also identify another neglected 
source of soft power – a country’s economic temptation, namely, if country A 
offers country B many opportunities for economic gains, then country B would 
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be reluctant to provoke country A on non-economic issues. Therefore country A 
has a soft power over country B in pressuring country B to make policies in 
favor of or at least not in disfavor of country A. In the case of China, due to the 
vast Chinese market and business potential, China offers the world enormous 
opportunities for wealth generation. Few countries would not be lured to such 
an economic magnet. Therefore, China has a strong soft power in its economic 
temptation over other countries19. China can utilize this soft power resource to 
alter other countries’ policy making to get its desired outcomes.  
 A clear evidence of this kind of soft power is the fact that the US 
Secretary of State Clinton played down the human rights issue, which had long 
been a major issue in the diplomacy between the US and China, when she 
made her first visit to China after the Obama administration took office in early 
2009. Secretary Clinton now talks a ‘smart power’ strategy, which is a 
combination of hard and soft power, in dealing foreign affairs because the 
Obama administration has realized that they cannot succeed in solving the 
current global financial crisis and other global challenges without cooperation 
from other countries. Among these countries, China is a key player, which is 
evident by the emergence of the concept of G2, i.e., the US and China, first 
proposed by C. Fred Bergsten (2006), the director of the highly-respected think 
tank Peterson Institute for International Economics in the United States.  
 We argue these six soft power resources are the major sources of soft 
power, which can be generalized, i.e., applied to any country. In the meantime, 
we also argue there might be some country-specific soft power resources which 
are unique to particular countries while others do not have. For instance, 
Japanese management system was very influential in the West in 1980s and 
1990s. Because Japanese management philosophy and practice was unique 
and very different from the Western, it gave Japan a unique source of 
international influence, i.e., Japan’s soft power. Another example is ancient 
Chinese military philosophy, such like Sun Zi’s famous writing The Art of War, 
which is still very influential in the world.  
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3.4 Causal mechanism of soft power 
Huang and Ding (2006: 25) point out that Nye’s theory fails to provide ‘a 
causal mechanism to explain how states convert potential soft power resources 
to realized power or the changed preference/behavior of others’.  They have 
offered such a mechanism which is explained as follows: 
‘Country A may have various combinations of soft power resources to tap 
into…These soft power resources can have their impact felt by political 
elites, interest groups, and the general public (“policy actors”) in country B. 
Assuming the international context favors A’s projection of soft power (e.g., 
lack of viable competition from other countries), country A’s reputation, 
image and influence would be viewed in a positive manner in country B, 
which, in turn, would prompt policy actors in B to be in tune with A’s views, 
approaches, and values in the decision making process. A is said to be 
able to achieve desired policy outcomes if this policy resonance leads B to 
directly support A’s foreign policy, implement policies that are in A’s 
interests, or look to A for leadership and guidance. Ultimately, the foreign 
policy success of country A will be translated into extra soft power 
resources for future use’. 
 In Huang and Ding’s (2006) causal mechanism, we see a feedback loop 
where country B’s policy outcome as a signal is sent back to country A for it to 
respond accordingly, namely, if the outcome of country B’s policy making is in 
country A’s favor, such a foreign policy success of country A will be translated 
into country A’s extra soft power resources for future use; on the other hand, if 
country B’s policy outcome is not in country A’s favor, country A will need to 
improve its soft power resources and strengthen the diplomatic relationship with 
country B.  
 In addition to above Huang and Ding’s (2006) feedback loop, we also 
identify another positive feedback mechanism, namely, country B’s perception 
of country A’s soft power may be self-reinforced, especially when country B 
perceives a sudden increase in country A’s soft power. For instance, in recent 
years there is a steady increase of Chinese influence in the US, and with the 
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burst of the global financial crisis, there is a sudden increase of China’s 
importance in Americans’ eyes. Although China has not changed much over the 
past few months, the American perception of China’s soft power has been 
strengthened largely due to the positive feedback, i.e., self-reinforcing 
mechanism. This is clearly shown by an article titled ‘Fearing China’20 published 
on the Newsweek on 20 May 09, which states ‘Beijing’s flurry of activity is 
starting to make Americans jittery’.  
 
3.5 Channels for wielding soft power 
Kurlantzick (2006: 1) argues that soft power can be ‘high’, targeted at 
political elites, or ‘low’, targeted at the broader public. These two parts of soft 
power are different for two reasons. One is that high soft power is more direct 
than low soft power because political elites can exert more immediate impact on 
policy making than general public can. Normally, general public can impact 
policy making through public opinion, protest, and referendum. Another reason 
is the fact that soft power over high level political elites does not directly 
translate into soft power over low level general public, an evidence being the 
contrast that while the White House sends goodwill gestures to China the US 
congress expresses hostility (Wang, 2008:260).  
In connection with Huang and Ding (2006), we add a middle level of soft power, 
targeted at the interest groups whose impact on a country’s policy-making is 
more direct than the low level general public but less direct than the high level 
political elites. Interest groups include business associations, ethnic groups, 
trade unions, non-governmental organizations, and others. We argue there are 
accordingly three basic channels through which a country can wield its soft 
power to influence another country: formal diplomacy targeting the political 
elites, economic and public diplomacy targeting interest groups, and public 
diplomacy targeting the general public of another country.  
 
3.6 An integrative model of soft power  
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 To put all the basics abovementioned together, we present an integrative 
model of soft power in Figure one. 
 
 
4. How to build China’s soft power 
 Accordingly, China can build its soft power in six areas and wield through 
three diplomatic channels.  
 
4.1 Culture 
 In terms of cultural attractiveness, China has enormous competitive 
cultural resources. According to an international survey in 1999, China was 
regarded as a nation with a unique culture and tradition (Lai, 2006). Nurtured by 
its five thousand year history, China now owns many unique and attractive 
cultural resources, e.g., Chinese language (characters and calligraphy), 
Chinese philosophy (Confucianism, Zhong-Yong, Yin-Yang, and art of war), 
Chinese Buddhism, Chinese music (Chinese traditional music is performed in 
Vienna Golden Hall since 1997), movies (especially martial art movies), arts 
(porcelain, painting, handicrafts, etc.), architecture, Chinese food, Chinese 
medicine, Chinese Kongfu (martial arts and Tai Ji), Chinese Spring Festival, 
and China towns in major cities all over the world.  
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In recent years China has paid much more attention on promoting Chinese 
culture overseas. For instance, Until October 2008, China has established 326 
Confucius Institute in 81 countries and regions21 to promote Chinese language 
and culture, and China plans to have 500 Confucius institutes worldwide by 
201022. In addition, China undertakes over 1300 cultural exchanges a year, 
such as sponsoring ‘Year of Chinese culture’, ‘Chinese cultural festival’ and 
Chinese New Year celebrations in the US, France, the UK, Russia, and 
Thailand (Lai, 2006: 2). China also hosted the first World Chinese Conference23 
in July 2005 and the first international Buddhism forum in 2006. China now 
sends more and more movies to the international movie festivals.  
 However, in spite of such rich resources and great efforts, China still lags 
far behind the US in terms of cultural influence overseas because China lacked 
of an overall strategy for culture and Chinese cultural industry is small and lacks 
of international competitiveness partly because it is difficult to export. Chinese 
government has realized this limitation and made its first ever five-year plan for 
cultural development 24  in 2006 which stipulates the reform of its cultural 
management system and the development of its cultural industries.  We see this 
plan very timely and valuable. We suggest Chinese government should further 
consolidate the coordination of cultural resources overseas because many of 
the cultural promotion activities are still performed on an ad hoc basis which 
limits their influence. If most of these ad hoc activities are to be coordinated, 
synergy effect will help generate much more influence. We think the Confucius 
Institute can be such a coordinating agency. This then demands more financial 
and human resources that are problematic currently, due to a mismatch 
between the rapid expansion of the number of Confucius Institutes and the 
necessary organizational capability which can only build over time.  
 
4.2 Political values 
 There are two aspects of a country’s political values: one domestic, i.e., 
how the government rules its own people, and one international, i.e., the 
principles and policies when dealing with other nations and international affairs.  
14  Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2009 - 28  
Western scholars frequently criticize Chinese domestic political values by 
referring to lack of democracy, violating human rights and suppression of 
freedom, and some scholars argue this is the underbelly of China’s soft power 
(Huang and Ding, 2006: 32; Lai, 2006: 12). Admittedly, there are many 
problems in China: corruption, censorship, unequal opportunities, privileged 
class, and lack of transparence, etc. After all, many people believe China is still 
an authoritarian regime (e.g., Nathan, 2003). We support Colley’s (2009) 
viewpoint that many people (especially in the West) tend to see China’s 
development as a glass half empty or largely focus on the negative aspects of 
China’s development. What those people neglected is the fact that Chinese 
government has made much progress in terms of political civilization (Yu, 2007) 
since the start of reform and opening up while its process is a rather 
incremental one (Yu, 2008). Started since the end of Cultural Revolution before 
which the main political ideology was class struggle, Chinese Communist Party 
has been drastically reforming its political system and improving its domestic 
political values. Many new ideas have been officially adopted by the CCP 
government, such as hearing system in 1996, rule of law in 1997, civil society in 
1998, developing political civilization in 2001, human-oriented in 2003, 
protection of human rights and protection of private property written in national 
Constitution in 2004, and building a socialist harmonious society in 2004. Colley 
(2009) argues ‘when Chinese leaders like Wen Jiabao talk of “putting people 
first” and developing a “harmonious society”, they tend to mean it’. We argue 
China needs and can have more and substantial improvement in domestic 
governance because even within the current political system a one party 
democracy can be developed; and in the mean time, China needs to better 
communicate with outside world what progress China has made and what the 
political reform it plans to proceed.  
 Internationally, China has consistently followed the principles of peaceful 
coexistence and no-interference of other nation’s domestic affairs which reward 
China a friendly and peaceful image in many countries. China’s proposal of 
building a harmonious world not only is consistent with its long-held peaceful 
coexistence principle but also offers the world a brighter new world order. 
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According to Wang and Lu (2008), in the reform ear, Chinese has adopted an 
independent foreign policy, i.e., resistant to outside pressure, free from 
alignment, non-ideological, and non-confrontational, which together with its 
good neighbor policy have made China appealing. China has been sensitive to 
being seen as a responsible stakeholder and behaving accordingly. For 
instance, in 1997 Asian financial crisis, Chinese government resisted the 
pressure for RMB devaluation which helped East Asia recover at China’s own 
expense of detrimental economic consequences in short run. In dealing with 
North Korean nuclear crisis, China abandoned the ideological approach it had 
used in Maoist time and played an active mediating role in the six-party talk. In 
order to promote peace, China has also made unprecedented concessions in 
solving the territorial disputes with its neighboring countries (Fravel, 2005). We 
see these as a strong source of China’s soft power.  
 Although some scholars argue China’s practice of non-interference might 
jeopardize some western countries’ efforts to pressure some dictatorship 
regimes to democratize their domestic governances, we argue China should not 
compromise on this non-interference principle. The normal practices of Western 
powers is to use economic sanction and arms embargo to force changes in 
domestic governance, which can be argued to have little and even negative 
impact on solving the very problems. Simply, many sanctioned countries are 
those in urgent need of economic development and economic sanction may 
bring human disasters to those countries. Having said this, we nevertheless 
suggest China to be more flexible to work more closely with international 
organizations and relevant western powers to find alternative ways to solve 
those problems.  
 
4.3 Development model  
 So far, China’s economic growth has been impressive and successful, 
which gives China another very strong source of soft power (cf. Wang and Lu, 
2008: 429). This is evident when countries, authoritarian or liberal, like North 
Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, India, 
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Iran, Brazil, and Zimbabwe have shown their interest in the so-called ‘Beijing 
Consensus’ (Huang and Ding, 2006:29), coined by Joshua C. Ramo in 2004, as 
an alternative development model to the withering Washington Consensus.  
 However, some scholars, from China and abroad, argue against the 
Chinese economic development model as it has some serious problems, such 
as corruption, pollution, environment degradation, high consumption with low 
efficiency of use of energy and resources, rural-urban gap, regional disparity 
and income disparity, etc. Admittedly, these are serious challenges facing China, 
but they are problems of the development process. No country can grow without 
problems. It is not easy to have made such a progress in a short period for a big 
country like China with a 1.3bn population and starting from a very poor basis. 
Moreover, Chinese leaders have been aware of these problems and have 
decided to switch to a better development strategy – the so-called ‘scientific 
development view’ – which aims to build a more sustainable and harmonious 
society. According to this new development strategy, China aims to reduce the 
gaps between urban and rural areas, between rich and poor, between coastal 
east and inland west; China is to transform the central and local governments 
into clean and efficient service-type governments; and China strives to upgrade 
its economic structure by strengthening high-value-added industries and making 
obsolete those of high energy consumption, high pollution and low-efficiency. 
So, it is critical for China to make these changes happen. The success of 
China’s economic development will not only benefit Chinese people but also 
contribute to the development economic thinking globally.  
 In addition to its domestic success, Chinese development model has 
another dimension of attraction: it offers the developing country ‘opportunities 
not available under established structures of power’ (Wesley-Smith, 2007). In 
the 1990s, many developing countries had to implement Washington 
Consensus-based reform agenda because there was no alternative while ‘the 
international pressures were too great to do otherwise, and the capacity of 
international financial institutions to compel obedience too large’ (cited in 
Wesley-Smith, 2007: 21). And often times, western aid donors attach stringent 
conditionality when giving developing countries international aid. The 
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conspicuous lack of success of such Washington Consensus-based reform 
efforts in the 1990s (World Bank, 2005) has given the Chinese model of 
independent development and no-strings-attached aid a warm welcome in the 
Global South. In Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s (2006) words, China can offer 
the developing world ‘a new model for South-South cooperation’ which is based 
on ‘peaceful coexistence, equality, and respect for the social systems, 
sovereignty, and independence of [other nations]’ and China’s willingness ‘to 
provide assistance without any political strings attached’ (Wesley-Smith, 2007: 
23).   
 As Wang and Lu (2008: 440) point out Chinese government has shunned 
the more provocative phrase of ‘Beijing Consensus’ but Chinese officials have 
not been shy to speak of the Chinese development model. This is partly 
because China does not want to raise a different banner that competes with the 
Washington Consensus (Yu, 2004) while Chinese officials see the Socialism 
with Chinese characteristics as a viable alternative to the Western theory of 
modernization. Apparently, China has learned the lessons of its zealous effort to 
export its revolutionary model during Mao’s leadership, so Chinese government 
is quite prudent in promotion its development model nowadays. Nevertheless, 
we suggest China to find a flexible way to communicate its development model 
to strengthen its soft power because ‘the demonstration effect of the Chinese 
model as part of China’s political and moral power’ (Wang and Lu, 2008: 440).  
 
4.4 International institutions 
 Wang and Lu (2008: 425) point out a country’s ability to frame the 
international agenda and set the rules of the game is an important type of soft 
power.  
 China’s attitude towards participating international institutions has 
changed noticeably from little interested in the early opening era to proactive in 
recent years. In the mid-1960s, China was virtually isolated from international 
organizations when the government of Republic of China in Taiwan was 
representing China in the United Nations. Huang and Ding (2006: 30) observe 
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there has been a dramatic increase of China’s participation in international 
institutions and organizations in the post-Mao era. According to the Union of 
International Association’s 1994/1995 Yearbook of International Organization, 
China’s membership numbers exceeded 1000.  Huang and Ding (2006: 30) also 
reveal China’s compliance with international normative regimes is mixed and 
varies from poor to fair (in human rights) to fair (nonproliferation and national 
self-determination) and to good or excellent (free trade and sovereignty).  
 China is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council 
with veto power, which gives China a very strong position in international 
security. However, China’s influence on global financial and trade systems is 
very limited. China has been members of the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) yet with little voting rights. China joined the World Trade 
Organization in 2001 after substantial compromises but China does not 
obtained the status of market economy.  
 The 2008 global financial crisis gives China a unique opportunity to gain 
more influence in reorganizing the international financial order. With a strong 
growing economy and the world largest foreign exchange reserve before the 
outbreak of the global financial crisis, China has been seen by many people as 
a savior who is able to rescue the world. American think tank Peterson Institute 
for International Economics coined the G2 notion which was later supported by 
the World Bank’s president and chief economist (Zoellick and Lin, 2009). We 
suggest China to closely cooperate with other developing countries as well as 
developed countries of the G20, in so doing, China will become more active and 
gain more influence in global financial system. In the mean time, China should 
make substantial improvements in those areas with poorer compliance scores 
such as human rights.  
 
4.5 International image 
 A country’s international image is shaped by the behaviors and 
performances of its government, multinational corporations, products and brand 
names, and people. The Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao administration embraces the 
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idea of ‘putting people first’ and ‘building harmonious society’ since they took 
office, which has helped improve its governmental image home and abroad, for 
instance, from the quick response to the SARS epidemic to the rescue action in 
the Sichuan earthquake, from the success hosting the Beijing Olympic Games 
to granting foreign journalists rights to free interview in China. But as China still 
being viewed an authoritarian government (Nathan, 2003), westerners will 
always have some negative image about it.  
 Encouraged by the ‘go out’ strategy, there are more and more Chinese 
big corporations investing overseas. How these companies behave abroad will 
have a direct impact on China’s international image. And negative press can 
cause much damage on a country’s international image. For instance, some 
scholars observe some irresponsible conducts of Chinese companies in and the 
negative impacts on African countries which have created much tension 
between Chinese multinationals and the people of investing countries. Some 
people even charge Chinese businesses in Africa conducting neo-colonialism. 
Although it can be argued that Chinese investment in developing countries, 
especially in Africa, has brought more benefit than damage to those countries, 
China is still low on the learning curve with regard to outward foreign direct 
investments. 
 Chinese-made products are now sold all over the world. Normally, 
Chinese products are seen as cheap and lower quality than products from 
OECD countries. The cheap Chinese goods benefits many rich countries by 
keeping the inflation rate low and helping consumers cut living expenses. But 
the quality problems can have a very negative impact on China’s international 
image, such as the toxic milk scandal in 2008. Of course, there are more and 
more high quality products made in China, such as Lenovo computers, Haier 
refrigerators, Galanz microwave ovens and TCL TV-sets, among others. So, it 
is important that China builds its own industrial base consisting of multinational 
companies that are competitive internationally. 
 Overseas Chinese, visiting scholars and students studying abroad can 
also shape China’s international image. Normally, Chinese people abroad are 
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seen as polite and modest. Recent years, the number of Chinese students 
studying overseas has increased dramatically. More and more young Chinese 
students (under 18 years old) are sent abroad. As many of them are over-loved 
at home, some youngsters might not hold many traditional Confucian values, 
such as respecting elderly people, being modest, and hardworking and 
discipline, it is likely that they will behave different from those mature Chinese 
fellows, which may give local people of host countries a very different image 
about Chinese from their normally-held impressions.  
 To improve China’s international image and remove the 
misunderstanding of China, Chinese government has decided to invest USD 
6.6bn (CNY 45bn) to expand the reach and impact of its state-run media 
(Lawrence, 2009), such as the China Central Television (CCTV), Xinhua News 
Agency, and China Daily. Nevertheless, Chinese government has to learn how 
to improve its international image through public relations. For instance, in 2009 
Chinese navy intended to send the world a clear message of its willingness to 
build a ‘harmonious ocean’25 by sending its anti-pirate fleet to the Gulf of Aden 
and holding its first national naval parade. However, an article published by 
Singapore’s Straits Times on 15 May 2009 pointed out that Chinese navy needs 
public relations representatives who are adept at dealing with media and 
communication 26 . In addition to governmental efforts, Chinese companies 
should strictly adopt corporate social responsibility principle to self-regulate their 
business conducts overseas, and Chinese people should behave nicely abroad. 
Especially, Chinese companies should pay close attention to product quality 
and food safety, and Chinese people should try their best to correct those 
apparent misunderstanding about China when communicating with foreigners.  
 
4.6 Economic temptation 
 China should make efforts to maintain and increase its economic 
temptation to the world. In recent years, due to the increase of wage level, 
appreciation of Chinese currency, changes in Chinese labor law and 
environmental regulations, China is losing its cost competitiveness to lower-
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wage countries like Vietnam and India. Many foreign investors have relocated 
their investments from China to other places. This is a serious challenge to 
China.  
 To keep foreign investments and attract more FDI is very important to the 
Chinese economy. We suggest China to take two solutions to tackle this 
problem. One is for China to offer more business and investment opportunities 
to foreigners in its inland Midwest where the wage level is much lower than 
coastal region. China needs to give foreign investors many incentives, such as 
beneficial tax rates and good infrastructures while not compromising on the 
labor law and environmental regulation. We are sure about the business and 
investment potential of China’s Midwest. In 1999, Chinese government 
proposed the strategy of developing China’s west. Although there have been 
much progress in west regions, the gap between the east and the west has 
been widening (Han, Zhang, and Ma, 2008). Attracting FDI to China’s vast 
Midwest seems to be an ideal solution to boost development at the moment.  
 Second solution is for China to quickly upgrade its industrial structure to 
attract more high-value-adding businesses to invest in China. This is not only 
important for China to attract more foreign investment to fill the void left by 
relocation of some foreign businesses to other places, but also crucial for China 
to make its economy more competitive and sustainable. Since its opening up, 
China has attracted much of the world’s low-value-adding manufacturing 
investment to its coastal east, while these labor-intensive FDIs help providing 
employment opportunities for China’s migrant workers and generating export 
revenues, they also have caused many problems such as large consumption of 
natural resources, environmental pollutions, and imbalances in Chinese 
economy, i.e., too export-led growth pattern. Since China has rich human 
resources and sufficient financial capacity, we argue, if China can dedicate its 
resources into this industrial upgrade, we believe China can not only grow 
steadily but also offer the world more business and investment opportunities, 
hence more economic temptation.  
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 China needs to use more economic diplomacy to promote its business 
and investment opportunities overseas. China should send more delegations 
abroad to run investment promotion roadshow, hold more conferences on 
business and investment in China, and use international forums such as World 
Economic Forum annual conference to introduce investment opportunities in 
China.  
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